Olle Blomberg

In practice, what we blame people for—and the degree to which we blame them—partly depends on the outcomes of their intentions and efforts. We blame a murderer who kills more than the equally malicious person who fails to kill because the intended victim happened to wear a bulletproof vest. We also sometimes blame individuals as members of groups, implying that both the content and extent of our blame are influenced by the actions of others. Should our blame—whether directed at others or ourselves—be sensitive to outcomes and group membership in these ways? Compelling arguments suggest that it should not. First, a widely accepted principle holds that only factors under our control should affect how blameworthy we are. Secondly, it is arguable that only our own motivations and attitudes can genuinely reflect poorly on us, implying that neither the outcomes of our intentions and efforts nor the behaviour of others should bear on how blameworthy we are. In response to these arguments, I will develop an account of individual and collective moral responsibility that affirms the ethical significance of both the results of our actions and the actions of other members of groups to which we belong.